brain death have recently been made in the USA, Canada and the UK. The legal claim has been that brain-dead patients are not dead in accordance with the legal definition of brain death, and so are wrongly being declared dead.
Yet, the definitions of brain death in these countries are not the same. In this editorial, we examine the significance of these legal challenges and their potential impact on intensive care unit (ICU) practice. We discuss whether the legal position in the UK and Canada is more secure than that in the USA and, as a result, is less susceptible to any legal challenges that are likely to impact on ICU practice.
Jurisdictions which have legislation that mirrors that operative in the USA, such as Australia, potentially inherit the same legal difficulties that have arisen in the USA. We also discuss whether these jurisdictions might consider adopting the definition of brain death that is adopted in the UK and Canada to avoid further legal challenges.
The legal challenges to brain death in the UK
The position in the UK is relatively well settled. Although there is no statutory definition of death, a number of courts have noted, with clear approval, the historic Royal Colleges' Code of Practice [1] and its successor [2] , as providing the accepted medical standard for declaring death in the UK [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . The accepted standard is that death is: "the irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness, combined with irreversible loss of the capacity to breathe. . . The most well-publicised legal challenge to the diagnosis of brain death pursuant to this definition is that of Jahi McMath. This case has attracted significant media and academic attention around the world. The facts of her tragedy have been reported in medical and legal journals [10, 11] and have received extensive media coverage [12, 13] . Scanned copies of relevant legal proceedings are available online [14] . A related, although distinct, legal challenge is that Jahi has other persisting brain functions [16] . Jahi continued to sexually mature after her diagnosis of brain death and A possible legal reply to the necessity to lose all functions of the entire brain is to invoke the requirement in the UDDA that "the determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards." Since, under accepted medical standards, death is declared without meeting the requirement that all functions be lost, the argument would be that the words 'all' and 'entire' can be interpreted flexibly. However, it is unlikely that such an argument could legally succeed for two reasons. First, in a case we will come to shortly, a superior court in the USA has already cast doubt upon a medical standard that did not comply with the 'all functions of the entire brain' requirement. Second, a reference to accepted medical standards can be important where words used in statutes are capable of differing interpretations, as with the word 'reasonable' when used in the context of reasonable care.
However, this approach cannot be applied to the use of words like 'all' or 'entire', since doing so would amount to altering the statute (so that the requirement for 'all' functions to cease is replaced with the requirement that 'some' or 'critical' functions cease), and judges cannot step into the shoes of parliament to rewrite legislation in this way. A [17] were authoritative for declaring death "in accordance with accepted medical standards" as required by the UDDA (applicable in Nevada), since the hospital had followed the AAN guidelines. The court doubted that they were, since they did not adequately measure "all functions of the entire brain." [17] In response, the legislature in Nevada amended the Statute, providing that the AAN guidelines are to be the accepted medical standard applicable in Nevada [18] .
The problem with the amendment, as noted by Pope [11, 18] , is that it does not address the statutory requirement -which was not amended for Nevada -that irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain must cease in order to be correctly determined brain dead. [20] . The judge found that these guidelines represented the "accepted medical practice used by all physicians in not only Ontario but throughout Canada to determine death based on neurologic criteria." [19] The CMAJ Guidelines recommend that: "neurologically determined death be defined as the irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness combined with the irreversible loss of all brainstem functions, including the capacity to breathe" [20] .
The significance of the case is that it is not necessary to show the irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, but only all functions of the brainstem. Why, then, was a legal challenge brought in Canada, and why is it not equally as susceptible to legal challenge as the position is in the USA? The answer is that, before this case was brought, the legal definition of death simply had not been addressed in Ontario. Now that it has been addressed, the door appears to be closed on any future legal challenge. The case is on appeal on a number of grounds, but an appeal against the definition of death ruling is unlikely to succeed. The express judicial endorsement of the CMAJ Guidelines makes the legal position stronger in Ontario, and it is highly unlikely that a court would ever ignore all the jurisprudence Justice Shaw discussed from other states and provinces and determine for itself that accepted medical practice (as reflected in the CMAJ Guidelines) is not valid. Only a parliament could make such a momentous decision.
Conclusion
Although the medical criteria and their implications have remained relatively consistent over time, the societal decision to accept the medical community's proposal that brain death is death has never gone without legal challenge.
Yet, from the above cases, it is in the USA that uncertainly seems the greatest. Legislation has not shielded them from challenge and probably has made the situation harder not easier. Although it would take significant political will, it is always possible for the USA to change its legislation, as 
